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SEX DISCRIMINATION: THEORIES AND
DEFENSES UNDER TITLE VII AND
BUR WELL v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC.
Following the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
in 19641 dealing with equal opportunity and employment discrim-
ination, there arose a large body of case-law litigating Title VII
issues and a large body of articles dissecting the cases and
issues.2 Within this area, different methods for proving Title VII
violations and different types of defenses developed. Almost in-
evitably, confusion arose concerning the applicability of specific
defenses to specific types of Title VII violations.3 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to resolve some of this con-
fusion in a sex discrimination case captioned Burwell v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc.'
In Burwell, female flight attendants brought an action under
section 703(a) of Title VIP claiming that various aspects of East-
ern's employment practices were discriminatory on the basis of
sex. The two issues that survived for appellate review' were
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
2 No attempt will be made to cite all the articles or cases. One need only
glance through the Index to Legal Periodicals after 1964 to get an idea of the
number of articles written upon this subject.
See text accompanying notes 61-68 infra.
633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976) provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
' In the district court five aspects of Eastern's employment policy with
respect to pregnancy were at issue. These issues included:
(a) the separate treatment of pregnancy under Eastern's Group Com-
prehensive Medical Insurance; (b) the exclusion of pregnancy from
1
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Eastern's practice of divesting pregnant female flight attend-
ants of accumulated seniority when they transferred to ground
positions, and Eastern's policy requiring female flight attend-
ants to take maternity leave immediately upon learning of their
pregnancy.
At Eastern, all temporarily disabled flight attendants could
transfer to ground positions and continue to accumulate senior-
ity. In practice, though, pregnant flight attendants who trans-
ferred to ground positions lost all rights to retain accumulated
seniority. Eastern implemented this practice because it did not
consider pregnancy a "disability" within the terms of its general
transfer policy.' The stewardesses charged that this transfer
policy, although facially neutral, discriminatorily impacted upon
them. The other relevant policy of Eastern required all female
flight attendants to begin an unpaid maternity leave immediate-
ly upon knowledge of their pregnancy.' All pregnant attendants
were required to leave regardless of individual ability to continue
working.9 The stewardesses claimed that this practice also dis-
criminated against females. 10
With respect to the transfer policy and the requirement to
take maternity leave before the twenty-eighth week of pregnan-
Eastern's paid sick-leave policy and the impact of such exclusion on
other conditions of employment; (c) the policy that pregnant flight at-
tendants lose all accumulated seniority if they transfer to ground posi-
tions rather than take maternity leave; (d) the time limits placed on
guaranteed rights to reinstatement of flight attendants taking matern-
ity leave; and (e) the requirement that flight attendants must com-
mence maternity leave upon knowledge of pregnancy.
See 458 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1978). The district court upheld Eastern's
medical insurance and sick-leave plans, invalidated the seniority transfer policy
and the reinstatement limitations, and modified the mandatory maternity leave
requirement.
633 F.2d 361, 364 (4th Cir. 1980).
'458 F. Supp. 474, 483 (E.D. Va. 1978).
The district court noted that "[p]regnancy is the only physical condition
which automatically precludes a flight attendant from flying." Id.
1" It is unclear from the language in the district court and later in the circuit
court whether the plaintiffs claimed the mandatory maternity leave policy
adversely impacted upon them or whether the policy was discriminatory on its
face. This lack of distinction between the possible types of claims is relevant in
the discussion about the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories and
their appropriate defenses. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 83
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/13
SEX DISCRIMINATION
cy, the district court held the plaintiffs had made out a prima
facie case of sex discrimination which Eastern could not justify
as a business necessity or a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ). The district court did hold, however, that being less
than twenty-eight weeks pregnant was a BFOQ for which East-
ern could require flight attendants to cease flight duties.11
Eastern appealed this decision to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals. Based upon the Supreme Court decision in Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 2 a unanimous court affirmed the district
court's holding on the transfer policy issue. 3 The circuit court
divided on the mandatory maternity leave issue. Following the
district court's separation of this issue into the three trimesters
of pregnancy," the justices divided as follows: (1) a majority af-
firmed the district court's invalidation of Eastern's mandatory
leave during the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy and three
justices dissented; (2) a majority reversed the district court's in-
validation of the maternity leave policy during the thirteenth
through twenty-eighth weeks of pregnancy, with four dissenters;
and (3) a unanimous court affirmed the district court's upholding
of the mandatory leave after the twenty-eighth week of preg-
nancy. 15
In reaching its decision, the circuit court in Burwell noted
n 458 F. Supp. 474, 494-95, 499 (E.D. Va. 1978). The terms "business necess-
ity" and "bona fide occupational qualification" are defined and discussed in detail.
See text accompanying notes 38-60 infra.
2 434 U.S. 136 (1977). One claim in Satty involved a seniority policy similar
to Eastern's. Nashville employees returning from a forced maternity leave were
divested of previously accumulated seniority. The Court ruled that Nashville's
seniority policy imposed a substantial burden upon female employees which
adversely affected their employment opportunities at Nashville. In the absence of
any justification, Nashville's policy was held to be violative of Title VII.
13 633 F.2d 361, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1980).
"4 The district court found that by implementing a more narrowly drawn
practice, Eastern could achieve the same busines objectives with a lesser
disparate impact. Pursuant to this, the district court issued interim orders
relative to the three trimesters of pregnancy. The orders provided that during
the first trimester of pregnancy the decision of whether to work or not would rest
with the individual and her doctor. In the second trimester Eastern could require
monthly, and later weekly, permission from the flight attendant's doctor. Finally,
after the twenty-eighth week, Eastern could require the attendants to cease work
altogether. 458 F. Supp. 474, 504-05 (ED. Va. 1978).
I 633 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir. 1980).
1981]
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the confusion about which of two possible defenses-the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) or the business necessity-
should apply in a sex discrimination case."6 Focusing upon the
type of theory used to prove the Title VII violation, the circuit
court ruled: "In sex discrimination cases a clear disparate im-
pact discrimination will be tested by business necessity and a
clear disparate treatment discrimination will be tested by a
BFOQ."'7 The court then analyzed the issues before it in terms
of disparate impact and the business necessity defense. Al-
though the district court had also applied the business necessity
defense, the circuit court differed in its application of the
defense to the facts.
This Comment will discuss the rule propounded in Burwell
by analyzing the two theories for establishing Title VII discrim-
ination and their respective defenses. As the discussion will
show, this rule is generally adhered to by courts and has been
assumed to be true by most commentators. In addition, this
Comment takes the position that both the district court and the
circuit court in Burwell failed to view Eastern's mandatory
maternity leave policy within the terms of the proper legal
theory. Instead of viewing the policy as a disparate impact issue,
a disparate treatment analysis should have been used. Then, fol-
lowing its own rule, a BFOQ would be the allowable defense in
Burwell. Under the BFOQ it is likely the circuit court would not
have overturned the district court's holding on this issue.
Finally, the district court's and the circuit court's applica-
tions of the business necessity defense will be examined. Both
courts applied this defense but reached different results. The
circuit court's method differed from the district court's method.
in two ways. The circuit court did not want to substitute a
judicial judgment for business judgment in the area of risk
management and passenger safety; deference was extended to
Eastern's business judgment. In addition, the discriminatory im-
pact upon the flight attendants was characterized as a loss of fif-
teen weeks of employment. 8 Thus, Eastern's business purpose
"1 458 F. Supp. 474, 495 (E.D. Va. 1978). See also note 64 infra and accompa-
nying text.
17 633 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 1980).
1 Id. at 371-72.
[Vol. 83
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of enhancing passenger safety was found sufficiently compelling
to override this impact discrimination.
I. THEORIES AND DEFENSES UNDER TITLE VII
A. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
There are two theories for establishing prima facie
discriminatory employment practices under Section 703(a) of Ti-
tle VII. 9 These are termed disparate treatment discrimination
and disparate impact discrimination. Disparate treatment is the
most obvious type of discrimination. In such a case, the employ-
er openly engages in practices prohibited with respect to those
classes protected under Title VII. ° For example, an employer
may have a facially discriminatory policy of refusing to hire
females because the job involves lifting more than fifty pounds,
the hours are long, and the labor is "arduous."2' To establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show
that the employer's actions were based upon a discriminatory
inotive. Intent to discriminate is an element of the prima facie
case. In some cases, however, discriminatory motive can be in-
ferred from the mere differences in treatment because "ex-
perience has proved that in the absence of any other explanation
it is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on
impermissible considerations."'
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976).
2 See Rosenfield v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
Southern Pacific would not hire females for the position of agent-telegrapher
because of these job requirements. Southern Pacific assumed men could meet
these requirements but women could not.
See also Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.)
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), where Pan Am refused to hire male flight at-
tendants, believing that males did not possess the characteristics necessary for
calming and soothing anxious passengers; Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), where Southern Bell justified its
refusal to hire women because the job required lifting 30 pounds.
I Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978). This was a race
discrimination case in which the Court examined the process whereby a plaintiff
establishes a Title VII violation based upon an inference of discriminatory in-
tent. Here, Waters charged that Furnco's practice of hiring bricklayers by repu-
tation and personal recommendation discriminated against Blacks. In this situa-
tion, the Court held the employer must be given the opportunity to rebut the
inference of discrimination by showing a non-discriminatory reason for his ac-
1981]
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After the passage of Title VII, intentional racial discrimina-
tion was illegal. An employer simply could not justify these
types of employment practices.' Therefore, intentional race dis-
crimination quickly disappeared,2' but many "less-than inten-
tional" types of race discriination persisted. It is contended that
the disparate impact discrimination theory developed in this
context in order to combat this more subtle form of race discrim-
ination.25 Thus, a great number of race discrimination cases have
been disparate impact cases. Yet, the majority of sex discrimina-
tion cases in the past have been intentional, disparate treatment
cases." Some authors suggest intentional sex discrimination per-
sisted because the Title VII prohibition against using sex as an
employment criterion was never taken seriously by employers.
After the passage of Title VII, "sex discrimination was treated
with a frivolous sense of curiosity."" So it is that the develop-
ment and defining of disparate impact discrimination must be
discussed in relation to race discrimination.
In the race discrimination cases, courts began accepting the
argument that equal treatment did not necessarily indicate the
absence of discrimination. The principle emerged that the in-
quiry into possible race discrimination should include historical
considerations." Employer practices that were facially neutral
tions. The plaintiff must then show that the employer's reason is a mere pretext.
If the plaintiff fails to show the employer's reason as pretextual, the prima facie
case fails and there is no Title VII discriminaton. (Thus, the matter of affirmative
defenses is never reached).
See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Wright v. National
Archives & Records Service, 609 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 The statutory exception for Title VII discrimination, the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification, is not available to justify race discriminaton. See notes 38 and
39 infra.
24 See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 331 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK].
2 Id.
26 Id.
' Edwards, Sex Discrimination Under Title VII. Some Unresolved Issues,
24 LAB. L.J. 411, 412 (1973). See also BABCOCK, supra note 24, at 331.
" Edwards, supra note 27, at 412. It is noted here that the prohibition
against sex was an amendment to Title VII, and thus imparted the flavor of a
mere "afterthought."
29 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS,
[Vol. 83
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could, in some instances, perpetuate the present effects of past
intentional employer discrimination. Courts began holding that
this type of situation amounted to a violation of Title VII, and
this concept came to be known as the neutral rule doctrine.
Then, in 1971, the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
3 1
expanded the neutral rule doctrine beyond systems that merely
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination.32 The Court found
that intelligence tests administered by the company along with
a high school education requirement had the effect of substan-
tially disqualifying a greater number of Blacks than Whites from
initial employment or later transfers.3  Even though Duke
Power did not intend to discriminate now or in the past, this
was not dispositive of the issue. The Court said intent did not
necessarily "redeem" employment practices. 4 Rather, "[c]on-
gress directed the thrust of the Act [Title VII] to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply motivation."3
Thus, Griggs not only upheld the perpetuation of the past dis-
crimination doctrine, but also recognized that neutral practices
could have an adverse impact because of general societal or
cultural conditions.
REMEDIES 76 (J. Pemberton ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY].
W See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Here, the court found that Philip Morris' advancement, transfer, and seniority
policies, although facially neutral, did discriminate against those employees hired
under pre-Title VII discriminatory policies. "It is apparent that Congress did not
intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory pat-
terns that existed before the act [Title VII]." 270 F. Supp. at 516. A year later,
Local 189, United Papermark & Paperwork v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995-96
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), also ruled that a present neutral
seniority system which perpetuated past effects of racial discrimination was in
violation of Title VII.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has carved out an exception to the
present perpetuation doctrine. If a seniority system is not intended to discrim-
inate, then even if it has a discriminatory effect, it will be immune from attack.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
a, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See BABCOCK, supra note 24, at 343-44.
The Griggs court noted that Blacks had long received segregated and thus
inferior educations. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
Id. at 432.
SId.
See BABCOCK, supra note 24, at 343-44 and EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUN-
ITY, supra note 29.
1981]
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Today, the Griggs rationale has extended to "pure effect" or
impact situations where a neutral employment practice can be
challenged if it is shown that the practice substantially impacts
upon a class protected under Title VII. In sex discrimination
cases a type of disparate impact often alleged is the neutral
height or weight standard. A requirement that an employee be
at least 5'7" has the effect of disqualifying 95% of the female
population from employment." This is an example of pure
disparate impact.
B. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification and the Business
Necessity Defense
The two affirmative defenses recognized in Title VII actions
are the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) and the
business necessity justification. The BFOQ is an express excep-
tion to employment practices prohibited by Title VII.3 8 It is not,
however, available in a race discrimination case. 9 Sex as a
BFOQ has been narrowly interpreted by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),40 and this interpretation has
been noted with approval by the Supreme Court. 1 The relevant
portion of the EEOC Guidelines states that the Commission will
not allow the BFOQ in certain situations. These situations in-
clude:
(i) the refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based
See Note, Height and Weight Standards in Police Employment and the
Question of Sex Discrimination: The Availability of Two Defenses for a Neutral
Employment Policy Found Discriminatory Under Title VII, 47 So. CAL. L. REV.
585 (1974). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (minimum height
and weight standards for correctional officers); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 435
F. Supp. 55 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (physical ability test to determine strength for police
officers).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the subchapter (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business ....
" Note the language of the code section omits race as a basis for an employ-
ment practice which can be justified. Id.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1979).
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
[Vol. 83
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on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics
of women in general. For example, the assumption that the
turnover rate among women is higher than among men.
(ii) the refusal to hire an individual based on stereotype
characterizations of the sexes ....
(iii) the refusal to hire an individual because of the pref-
erences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers ... .2
However, sex may be considered a bona fide occupational
qualification in circumstances "where it is necessary for ... au-
thenticity or genuineness."43
An employer often will attempt to justify sex discrimination
as a BFOQ by claiming that the female (or male) cannot perform
the job. The BFOQ has been construed many times in this type
of situation and a two-prong test has emerged. Generally, the
employer must show that (1) all or substantially all women
would not be able to perform the required duties, and (2) that
such duties are essential to the business. The two decisions
which best set forth the present standards of the bona fide occu-
pational qualification are Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co." and Diaz v. Pan American World Airways."
In Weeks the phone company contended that women were
unable to lift thirty pounds; therefore, it was justifiable to
refuse to hire women as switchmen. The court said the phone
company was asking the court to "assume" that women could
not meet this lifting requirement. 8 The employer was in fact us-
ing a class stereotype-that women are weak-as a basis for
denying employment. Without proof that all, or substantially all,
women would be unable to safely and efficiently perform the re-
quired duties, the court concluded the phone company's employ-
ment practice violated Title VII." The Weeks court also in-
dicated that a showing in the abstract of the inability of women
12 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1979).
Id. An example is actor or actress. Also, in personal privacy situations an
employer can usually raise a valid BFOQ. See Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title
VII and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1059-72
(1977).
" 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
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to perform the particular job may not be sufficient. The
employer should also evaluate the employee individually to
determine whether a particular individual can safely and effi-
ciently perform the job in question. 8
The same court two years later" in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways0 emphasized the essential relation of the per-
formance requirement to the business. Under this standard, the
airline was not able to justify its practice of refusing to hire
males as flight attendants. Pan Am had presented psychological
data showing that males were not as capable as females in calm-
ing and soothing anxious passengers. Following the Weeks test,
Pan Am might have succeeded in its BFOQ. But the court ruled
that the essence of an airline's business was to provide safe
transportation." In this context, the ability to provide emotional
assurance for passengers was tangential, and the policy of hiring
only females, then, was not aimed at the essence of the business."2
Thus, Pan Am failed to establish a valid bona fide occupational
qualification for flight attendants based on sex.
The business necessity defense is a court-created justifica-
tion which developed simultaneously with the disparate impact
theory in race discrimination cases.53 Not only is Griggs v. Duke
Power Co." important for recognizing disparate impact viola-
tions of Title VII, but also for acknowledging that there may be
circumstances where an employer's neutral practice is justifiable
even though it has an adverse impact. If an employment practice
is shown to be manifestly related to job performance, then it is
not prohibited.5 In the Court's words: "the touchstone is
business necessity."5 Needless to say, these standards,
" Id.
,9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
4' Id. at 388.
4Id.
"See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermark & Paperwork v. United States, 416
F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), where the court in-
dicated the employer's neutral practice may be valid if there is an "overriding
legitimate, non-racial business purpose." "
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"1manifest relationship" and "business necessity," required fur-
ther definition to become workable and fairly predictable. As
these standards developed, they came to be known as the
business necessity defense.
The best formulation to date of the business necessity
defense is found in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.7 The defense as
formulated in Lorillard has been described as a balance between
business interests in safety and efficiency and the discrimina-
tory impact of the challenged business practice.-8 In Lorillard
the test for a business necessity is described as "whether there
exists an overriding business purpose such that the practice is
necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business."5
Included within the scope of the Lorillard test are four
elements. First, the challenged practice must be a necessity; it
must be necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business. Second, the business purpose must be sufficiently com-
pelling to override any discriminatory impact. Third, the prac-
tice in question must effectively carry out the business purpose
it is alleged to serve. Finally, there must not be available any
alternative practice which could accomplish the business pur-
pose equally well but with a lesser differential impact."
II. DETERMINING THE AVAILABILITY DEFENSE IN A
DISPARATE IMPACT SEX DISCRIMINATION CASE
A. The Confusion and the "Burwell" Rule
The development of the theories for proving Title VII viola-
tions and the development of the proper justifications for these
theories has not been a clear, well-defined process. A central
problem in this area is determining when a particular defense is
available and what distinctions, if any, should be made between
11 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 1006 (1971). Here, another
neutral seniority system was at issue. The employer failed to prove the challenged
practice was necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the transportation
business.
53 See, e.g., Note, Fair Employment Practices: The Concept of Business
Necessity, 3 MEM. ST. L. REV. 76, 83 (1972); Note, Business Necessity Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98,
99 (1974).
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the defenses. This was one of the problems faced in the sex dis-
crimination case of Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.81
Believing that Eastern's mandatory maternity leave policy
was a disparate impact issue, 2 the district court in Burwel3
was uncertain about which defense to allow. The court resolved
the problem by allowing both defenses.84 The Fourth Circuit,
however, corrected the district court, saying that only a bus-
iness necessity defense should have been applied. 5 Further-
more, in an attempt to clear the confusion of applicable defenses
in the future, the circuit court announced: "In sex discrimination
cases ... clear disparate impact discrimination will be tested by
business necessity and a clear disparate treatment discrimina-
tion will be tested by a BFOQ defense." 8
The district court's dilemma is understandable, though. If
the court in the interest of uniformity followed other districts
and circuits deciding similar flight attendant cases, then a bona
fide occupational qualification might be the proper defense." But
if the district court emphasized the broader issue of maternity
leaves as they impact upon other conditions of employment,
then following the Supreme Court, a business necessity defense
633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
It is arguable whether this policy is truly a disparate impact discrimina-
tion. See note 92 infra and accompanying text where it is contended this is really
facial, disparate treatment discrimination.
458 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1978).
Id. at 495. The court cautioned against confusing the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification and the business necessity defense. In a footnote the court ex-
pressed its opinion that there was no real difference between the defenses. But
the court concluded that if Eastern should fail the business necessity defense, the
discriminatory charge could still be overcome if Eastern came within the terms of
the BFOQ. Id. at 495-96 n.11.
633 F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 370.
', See Condit v. United Airlines, 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), affd on
rehearing, 631 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1980) (policy requiring mandatory maternity
leave is valid BFOQ); Harris v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp.
413 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (a BFOQlbusiness necessity test validates mandatory matern-
ity leave); In re National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (BFOQ in-
validates mandatory maternity leave); EEOC v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 441 F. Supp.
626 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd without formal opinion, 619 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1980)
(BFOQ validates mandatory maternity leave); Newmon v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 374
F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (BFOQ invalidates mandatory maternity leave).
[Vol. 83
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might apply." Rather than attempt to distinguish or reconcile
the defenses applied to specific kinds of issues, the Fourth Cir-
cuit looked instead to the type of theory used to prove the Title
VII violation.
B. The Validity of the "'Burwell" Rule and Distinguishing
the Defenses
The approach in Burwell applying a business necessity
defense in a disparate impact case and a bona fide occupational
qualification in a disparate treatment case has generally been
endorsed by most commentators. 9 Most courts in the past have
also tended to follow this approach, although it probably devel-
oped more by accident than by intention.
As discussed earlier, the business necessity defense
developed along with the disparate impact theory. 70 Courts fol-
lowing the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 71 decision in recognizing
"present effect" discrimination also cited the business necessity
as the proper defense. 72 When the Griggs principle expanded to
include "pure effects" of neutral systems, the business necessity
defense also advanced as the employer's method to justify his
business practice.71 Until employer practices were challenged on
the grounds of pure adverse effect, most disparate impact cases
were race discrimination cases.74 Since the BFOQ is specifically
not available to employers in a race discrimination suit,75 the
1 458 F. Supp. 474, 496 (E.D. Va. 1978). The court was referring to Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). "Satty indicates that a court analyzing a
maternity leave policy should first apply the business necessity defense." 458 F.
Supp. at 496,
" See, e.g., Oldham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title
VII-"Sex Plus" and the BFOQ, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 55, 72 (1971). See generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYER DIsCRIMINATION LAW 292 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
,o See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
7' 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971); Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 1006
(1971).
" See generally BABCOCK, supra note 24, at 343-44; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN,
supra note 69, at 134.
7' See BABCOCK, supra note 24, and accompanying text.
, Supra notes 38 & 39.
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only available defense was the business necessity defense. On
the other hand, most sex discrimination cases in the past were
disparate treatment violations of Title VII and the BFOQ auto-
matically applied. 78 Thus, the original distinction between the
theories and their appropriate defenses may have been based in
part upon different practices with respect to race and sex dis-
crimination cases. Then, when women began bringing disparate
impact cases to court, the early decisions followed the Griggs
line of cases and held the employers must demonstrate a
business necessity to justify their practices.7 Finally, the
Supreme Court also seems to have adopted this approach. In a
sex discrimination case, Dothard v. Rawlinson,78 the Court ap-
plied the BFOQ to Rawlinson's disparate treatment claim and
the business necessity defense to her disparate impact claim.
By formulating these general practices into a rule for sex
discrimination cases, the Fourth Circuit in Burwell was implicity
distinguishing the defenses. At first glance, however, the tests
for a BFOQ and a business necessity are almost indistinguish-
able. A valid bona fide occupational qualification will be found
when the discrimination based on sex is related to the essence of
the business and the employer can show that substantially all
women would be unable to safely and efficiently perform the re-
quired duties.79 A business practice may be held a valid necess-
ity when the practice is manifestly related to job performance
and where there is an overriding business purpose such that the
practice is necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the
business." Both defenses are concerned with factors of safety,
efficiency, and performace and have an element of "related-
ness." But close examination of these defenses reveals their
distinctive characteristics.
There are at least four differences between the defenses.
Perhaps the most crucial distinction is that the BFOQ focuses
upon the discrimination, the sex standard itself, as essential for
employment in a particular position. Sex must affect ability and
78 BABCOCK, supra note 24, and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 435 F. Supp. 55 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Of-
ficers for Justice v. Civil Service, 395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
" 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
" Supra notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text.
8 Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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the ability it affects must be essential to the job. Thus, being
female or male must be shown to affect an employee's ability to
safely and efficiently perform." A business necessity, on the
other hand, focuses upon the employer's particular business pol-
icy.82 There must be a showing that the business policy works in
fact to select those best able to perform the job and that such a
policy is necessary to insure the safe and efficient operation of
the business. Almost by definition, then, a BFOQ is concerned
with facial, disparate treatment discrimination, and a business
necessity concerns neutral employment practices with disparate
impact. Secondly, it must be remembered an employer can
never justify intentional race discrimination; the BFOQ is not
available in this situation. But a business necessity defense is
available to justify an employment practice which disparately
impacts upon particular races. Thirdly, a business necessity
defense has been described as a determination of whether there
is a legal discrimination." That is, a business practice will not be
held discriminatory under Title VII where there exist valid non-
discriminatory reasons for the practice. A BFOQ, though, is an
express exception to Title VII violations. 4 An employer may dis-
criminate if such discrimination is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication. Finally, it has been suggested that since the business
necessity defense has developed as a balancing test, this allows
the employer more opportunity to succeed." The BFOQ, how-
ever, has been held to a narrow, rather inflexible interpreta-
tion.8
The rule in Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. that in a
disparate treatment discrimination a BFOQ will apply and in a
"1 See generally Note, Height Standards in Police Employment and the
Question of Sex Discrimination: The Availability of Two Defenses for a Neutral
Employment Policy Found Discriminatory Under Title VII, 47 SO. CAL. L. REV.
585, 627 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Two Defenses].
82 For example, his seniority policy, transfer policy, or height and weight
standards for hiring. Id.
11 See Oldham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title
VII- "Sex Plus" and the BFOQ, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 55, 71 (1971).
SId.
See BABCOCK, supra note 24, at 348. The employer may have more oppor-
tunity to introduce factors such as cost as weighing on the side of business effi-
ciency. See also note 54 supra and accompanying text.
" Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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disparate impact discrimination a business necessity defense
will apply is generally supportable by past practices in Title VII
adjudication. Moreover, the implicit distinction the rule makes
between the defenses appears to be valid. 7 Perhaps in the final
analysis the Burwell rule contains an element of policy. Where
an employer intentionally discriminates or where his intention
can be inferred, the employer should be held to the stricter
BFOQ justification. But where there is no intention to discrim-
inate, the employer should be allowed the opportunity to show
that the discrimination is really an unfortunate result of a valid
and necessary business practice.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE BURWELL v. EASTERN
AIRLINES, INC. DECISION
The Burwell rule that in a clear disparate treatment case a
BFOQ will apply and in a clear disparate impact case a business
necessity defense will apply not only implies that it is important
not to confuse the defenses, but this rule also implies that it is
important not to confuse the theories proving the prima facie
violations of Title VII. Although the Fourth Circuit did state:
"[t]o say ... that the two defenses are mutually exclusive, and
each confined to a separate theory of liability would be over-
reaching,"' the court also said its rule was applicable in sex dis-
crimination cases. 9 Since it has been shown there are important
differences between the defenses which may affect the outcome
of cases, courts should be careful in their characterizations of an
issue as either disparate treatment or disparate impact. Con-
" There are those who see no meaningful distinctions between the defenses,
however. One author includes the business necessity defense as a "miscellaneous"
subcategory of the BFOQ and describes it as substantially similar to the BFOQ.
See Ragsdale, Defenses to Sex Discrimination Suits, 5 URBAN LAWYER 359,
366-67 (1973).
Another author includes the business necessity defense as an element of the
BFOQ. See Comment, "Dothard v. Rawlinson" Misapplication of the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification Defense, 22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 197, 201-02 (1978).
Still another writer suggests that both defenses be allowable in some
disparate impact cases despite the differences between the defenses. See Two
Defenses, supra note 81.
Finally, the district court in Burwell also thought both defenses should be
applied. See note 64 supra.
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ceding that there may be circumstances when it is unclear whe-
ther an issue is one of disparate impact or disparate treatment,
the court called for judicial flexibility. In these circumstances,
either theory or defense should apply." At any rate a court
should at least make the initial determination that it is unclear
which type of Title VII discrimination is appropriate.
Both the district court and the circuit court in Burwell failed
to properly characterize the mandatory maternity leave issue as
one of disparate treatment. Because of this failure, the original
confusion as to the proper defense arose in the district court.
Also because of this failure, the wrong defense was applied in
the circuit court.
In addition, the circuit court's application of the business
necessity defense included two factors that may prove troubling
in future sex discrimination cases. First, the court's refusal to
intervene in an area of business denoted as crucial and complex
may in the future insulate employers even when their policies
may be based upon stereotypical assumptions concerning ability.
Secondly, the characterization of the discriminatory impact as a
loss of fifteen weeks of employment may set the ground for mea-
suring impact discrimination quantitatively rather than in terms
of all the immeasurables included in the concept of employment
opportunity.
A. The Mandatory Maternity Leave Policy is Disparate
Treatment Discrimination
In Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. the female flight attend-
ants originally challenged five aspects of Eastern's employment
practices. These practices included Eastern's insurance cov-
erage, sick-leave policy, seniority policy, reinstatement rights
after maternity leave, and the requirement that maternity leave
must begin immediately upon knowledge of pregnancy." Al-
though some of these practices are facially neutral, it is at least
arguable that two of them are not. It is not clear that reinstate-
ment rights after maternity leave or the mandatory maternity
11 Id. at 370 n.16. Presumably, the court meant that even in these unclear
situations only one defense should apply and not both. But which one?
1, 458 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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leave policies are facially neutral. But the district court appears
to have assumed all the policies were neutral.12 The court resolved
four of the issues, however, without really analyzing them with-
in the terms of disparate impact. Ruling that the Supreme Court
decisions in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 3 and Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty9" controlled, the district court upheld Eastern's in-
surance plan and sick-leave policy but invalidated Eastern's
reinstatement policy and seniority policy."
Upon reaching the mandatory maternity leave issue, the
district court, still assuming it was dealing with a facially
neutral policy, applied both the business necessity and the bona
fide occupational qualification defenses. Cautioning against con-
fusing the defenses, the court proceeded to consider the de-
fenses separately."' In a footnote the court revealed that it was
really confused about which defense to apply." The court con-
In discussing how to prove prima facie violations of Title VII, the court
talked about disparate impact discrimination. Recognizing that proof of intent to
discriminate is not always necessary, the court said the specific issues involved
would be viewed within this "general framework." Id. at 490-91.
93 429 U.S. 126 (1976).
434 U.S. 136 (1977).
"5 In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 126 (1976), the Supreme Court
held that an employer's failure to include benefits for pregnancy-related
disabilities was not discriminatory. Thus, the district court in Burwell held
Eastern was under no obligation to provide greater benefits for women because
of pregnancy; therefore, Eastern's insurance plan was upheld.
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), the company's paid sick-
leave policy which excluded women on maternity leave was upheld on the basis of
Gilbert. It was said in Satty that the paid sick-leave policy was a benefits type
policy "legally indistinguishable from the disability program upheld in Gilbert."
434 U.S. at 143. Based on these cases, then, the district court in Burwell held
Eastern's sick-leave policy was non-discriminatory.
Also at issue in Satty was a seniority policy similar to the one at issue in
Burwell. Women returning to work at Nashville after a maternity leave were
divested of all accumulated seniority. It was held in Satty that those practices
which imposed substantial burdens upon women were discriminatory. Relying
upon this rationale, the district court in Burwell found Eastern's seniority policy
and reinstatement policy to be a Title VII discrimination that Eastern had failed
to justify as a business necessity. See Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 458 F.
Supp. 474, 491-94 (E.D. Va. 1978).
" Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 495 (E.D. Va. 1978).
'"[it is not entirely clear whether Eastern's maternity leave policy should
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eluded that even if an employer is found to be in violation of Ti-
tle VII by failure to establish a valid business necessity, the
employer could still justify its practice as a BFOQ. Since a
BFOQ is an express exception to Title VII, the court reasoned
this defense would always be available whenever an employer is
in violation of Title VII 8 Finally, the court held that Eastern
was not justified by a business necessity in requiring flight at-
tendants to cease flight duties upon learning of their pregnancy.
But Eastern could require as a valid bona fide occupational qual-
ification that flight attendants be fewer than twenty-eight
weeks pregnant.9
When the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
mandatory maternity leave issue, it too assumed it was dealing
with a facially neutral policy.1 10 Although there was discussion of
the different methods of proving Title VII violations, there was
no discussion of whether the mandatory maternity leave was in
fact a neutral policy. But, assuming the maternity leave require-
ment was facially neutral with a disparate impact upon women,
the circuit court ruled only the business necessity defense would
apply in a disparate impact sex discrimination case. Further-
more, in a clear disparate treatment sex discrimination, only a
BFOQ would apply.0 ' The court then applied its version of the
business necessity defense to the facts and held that Eastern
was justified in requiring flight attendants to cease flight duties
after the thirteenth week of pregnancy.'
It is this writer's contention, however, that Eastern's man-
datory maternity leave policy was actually facially discrim-
inatory. Eastern's practice was not a neutral policy. Eastern's
practice of requiring women to immediately take leave upon
knowledge of pregnancy affected no other class of employees.
Similarly, there was no requirement for employees to im-
mediately take leave for any other health-related condition that
might impair job performance." 3 Instead, individuals who
developed "non-pregnancy related health problems" were indi-
9a Id.
458 F. Supp. 474, 494-95, 499 (E.D. Va. 1978).
633 F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir. 1980).
101 Id. at 369, 370.
112 Id. at 370-72, 373.
"I Id. at 365.
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vidually evaluated to determine their continued ability to per-
form."4 This, then, was not a neutral disability policy which in
its "effects" discriminated against women. Rather, Eastern
openly treated differently those employees who became preg-
nant.
But implicit in the Burwell decision is the view that dif-
ferences because of pregnancy do not necessarily amount to dif-
ferences based on sex. Although neither the district court nor
the majority in the circuit court indicate this, their view is prob-
ably based upon the Supreme Court decision in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert."5 Holding that General Electric's insurance plan
did not discriminate against pregnant women, the Court in
Gilbert said, "[w]hile it is true that only women can become
pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification ....,," But
''pregnancy" and "maternity leave" are not neutral terms.
Pregnancy is an identifying characteristic of women; only
women become pregnant. Yet Burwell (and Gilbert) seem to say
that although different treatment based on sex is prima facie
violation of Title VII excepted only by a BFOQ, different treat-
ment because of pregnancy may not even amount to discrimina-
tion. In other words, the underlying rationale seems to be that
while it may be illegal to treat women differently because of
their sex, surely this prohibition is not meant to extend to preg-
nant women.
This view of pregnancy as not necessarily related to sex
discrimination may reflect a subtle vestige of romantic pater-
nalism. That is, the pregnant woman, in her delicate condition,
needs protection; she should not be out working. This view may
also reflect the stereotypical role assigned to women. Several
writers have commented upon the pervasiveness of this assump-
1" Id. See also id. at 376 where it is noted that flight attendants with con-
trolled diabetes or epilepsy are allowed to fly.
10 429 U.S. 126 (1976). However, Justice Murnaghan in his concurrence and
dissent in Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), did
discuss Gilbert with respect to the issue of whether the plaintiffs had established
prima facie discrimination. The issue framed by Justice Murnaghan was whether
pregnancy as an identifying characteristic of sex is a difference which should be
allowed to make a difference. 633 F.2d at 377-79.
1 429 U.S. 126, 134 (1976).
[Vol. 83
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tion by courts in general,1" and by the Supreme Court in Gilbert
in particular."0 8 One author has termed this undercurrent the
"pregnancy myth."'" This myth is based on the belief that
motherhood, not paid worker, is a woman's role. This author fur-
ther argues that "to view the pregnant worker as uniquely
situated [which is what Gilbert said] is clearly stereotyping; it
locks woman into the biological role of temporary or second-
class worker, primary mother, and society's womb."110
However, Gilbert was practically limited to its facts by the
decision one year later in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty.111 Satty
distinguished between benefits and burdens. An employer may
not be obliged to include pregnancy as an insurance benefit, but
policies that place substantial burdens upon women because of
pregnancy may be discriminatory. But Gilbert was even further
limited by the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
in 1978."' This amendment to Title VII expressly sets forth that
differing treatment because of pregnancy is a difference based
on sex. Thus, employment practices based on pregnancy may be
construed as facially discriminatory on the basis of sex. Further-
more, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act can be viewed as an at-
tempt to exorcise those subtle assumptions concerning the preg-
nant woman's role in the labor market.
1o0 See, e.g., Edwards, Sex Discrimination Under Title VIL Some Unre-
solved Issues, 24 LAB. L.J. 411 (1973); BABCOCK, supra note 24, at 316-17.
1c See, e.g., Comment, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employ-
ment: The Impact of "General Electric Co. v. Gilbert" and "Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty," 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 717 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Differential
Treatment], and Comment, "General Electric Co. v. Gilbert" A Lesson in Sex
Education and Discrimination-The Relationship Between Pregnancy and
Gender and the Vitality of Disproportionate Impact Analysis, 1977 UTAH L. REV.
119.
See Differential Treatment; supra note 108, at 724.
ill Id. at 725.
iii 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
l Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). The pertinent portion of the Act
provides:
The terms "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex" include but
are not limited to because or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment
related purposes, including receipt of benefit programs, as other per-
sons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
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Although Burwell was decided in the district court before
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was enacted, this should not
have precluded the court from considering differences based on
pregnancy as facially discriminatory. Even Gilbert did not
represent that differences based on pregnancy would never be
facially discriminatory. Gilbert only pointed out that not every
classification based on pregnancy would be a sex-based classifi-
cation."' Moreover, the language of the majority in the circuit
court in Burwell seems to belie its analysis of the mandatory
maternity leave issue as one of disparate impact. The court con-
cedes that Eastern's mandatory maternity leave was the only
practice related to health requiring immediate leave. Persons
with other health-related conditions were individually evalu-
ated.' In addition, the court framed the issue as "a case ... in-
volving an employer prohibiting outright a woman from working
because of her pregnancy." ' Thus, it seems there was a tenden-
cy to view the differences based on pregnancy as facial
discriminations based on sex. But because the court assumed it
was dealing with a neutral disability practice, it never came to
terms with pregnancy as it related to sex discrimination.
Had the circuit court found Eastern's maternity leave re-
quirement to be facially discriminatory, then under its own rule
a BFOQ defense would have applied."' Because the bona fide oc-
cupational qualification has been interpreted narrowly by EEOC
Guidelines 17 and case-law,118 it is doubtful Eastern would have
come within this Title VII exception. The EEOC Guidelines pro-
hibit stereotypical assumptions as a basis for difference in treat-
ment.' In Burwell there may be an argument that Eastern's
Ill General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 126, 134 (1976).
Other airline cases prior to Burwell, however, did find that Gilbert foreclosed
considering employment practices related to pregnancy as disparate treatment
discrimination. See, e.g., Harris v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 437 F.
Supp. 413 (N.D. Cal. 1977); In re Nat'l Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
11, Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 368.
"' "In sex discrimination cases ... clear disparate impact discrimination will
be tested by business necessity and clear disparate treatment discrimination will
be tested by a BFOQ." Id. at 370.
1'7 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
"' See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
"' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1979).
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mandatory maternity leave was based on the assumption preg-
nant women are weaker and more prone to sickness and thus
unable to perform their duties."' Under the DiazlWeeks test12'
Eastern must show that substantially all pregnant women could
not perform their flight duties. Weeks also indicates that there
must be an individual evaluation regarding ability to perform.
Further, Diaz requires Eastern to show that the characteristic
of sex upon which it relies relates to the essence of the business.
Eastern must show that non-pregnancy is essential for safe
transportation. It is doubtful Eastern could have met this
burden. The circuit court even doubted Eastern would succeed
under a BFOQ justification."
B. The Application of the Business Necessity Defense
in "Burwell"
The district court and the circuit court in Burwell v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc."' both applied the business necessity
defense to the same set of facts, but they arrived at different
conclusions. These differences resulted from using different
approaches in the weighing of the elements of the business ne-
cessity defense. The district court weighed the availability of
alternative practices more heavily, thereby holding Eastern's
mandatory maternity leave policy was unjustified when alter-
native practices were available."" The circuit court's approach
was to weigh fifteen lost weeks of employment against the com-
plex area of risk management and passenger safety. As a result
of this approach, Eastern was held justified in requiring preg-
nant flight attendants to cease flying after the thirteenth week
" The parties in Burwell did enter medical evidence relating to a pregnant
flight attendant's ability to perform. The district court resolved these issues of
fact under the business necessity defense in favor of the plaintiffs. The district
court did find, however, that the medical evidence showed Eastern was justified
in requiring a flight attendant to be less than twenty-eight weeks pregnant. See
Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1978).
" See notes 44 & 45 supra and accompanying text.
" Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 370 n.15 (4th Cir. 1980).
"3458 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1978), affd in part and rev'd in part, 633 F.2d
361 (4th Cir. 1980).
"' The district court did find that under the BFOQ Eastern may require a
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of pregnancy."' It is somewhat troubling, however, that the cir-
cuit court characterized the discriminatory impact as only a loss
of fifteen weeks of employment and refused to intervene in an
area of decision-making termed "crucial" and "complex." This
seems to suggest deference to any stereotypical assumptions
concerning the ability of pregnant women that may have been
made by Eastern when it designed its mandatory maternity
leave policy.
The business necessity defense as developed in Robinson v.
Lorillard1" is "whether there exists an overriding legitimate
business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe
and efficient operation of the business."1" There are four ele-
ments included within the scope of this test. First, the chall-
enged business practice must be necessary to the safe and effi-
cient operation of the business. Second, the business purpose
must be sufficiently compelling to override any discriminatory
impact. Third, the practice must effectively carry out the
business purpose it is alleged to serve. Finally, there must not
be available any alternative business practice which could ac-
complish the business purpose equally well but with a lesser dif-
ferential impact."
Both the district court and the circuit court in Burwell used
the Lorillard test for business necessity. Conceding that
passenger safety was an overriding legitimate business purpose,
the district court further reasoned that Eastern could accomp-
lish this purpose equally well with less disparate impact. Instead
of requiring immediate leave upon knowledge of pregnancy,
Eastern could simply set a later date for maternity leave and
condition further employment upon a doctor's permission.n In
this manner, the discriminatory impact upon the flight attend-
ants would be less. Four concurring justices in the circuit court
agreed with this approach. To them, the critical issue was
whether there were any suitable alternatives available to the
633 F.2d 361, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1980).
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
' Id. at 798.
I Id.
" Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 496 (E.D. Va. 1978).
[Vol. 83
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challenged business practice. 3 ' The emphasis was on the fourth
element of the Lorillard test.
Analyzing the first element of the Lorillard test, the circuit
court found that Eastern's mandatory maternity leave policy
was necessary for the safety of the passengers. Moreover, the
court thought the medical testimony relating pregnancy to job
performance was subjective."' Because of this subjectivity and
because the area of risk management for passenger safety is
crucial and complex, the court extended deference to Eastern's
business judgment.'3 2 Inquiring into the second Lorillard ele-
ment, the court balanced the extent of the discriminatory im-
pact against the value of the business purpose. The discrimina-
tory impact upon the flight attendants was characterized as only
a loss of fifteen weeks of employment. Thus, the business pur-
pose of passenger safety was found to be sufficiently compelling
to override this impact."' Next, the court had no doubt that
Eastern's maternity leave policy effectively carried out its pass-
enger safety business purpose. In this manner the third Loril-
lard element was disposed of. Finally, the court found little
merit in the district court's proposed alternative. It was re-
jected on the basis of insufficient evidence." Based upon this ap-
plication of the business necessity defense, the court held
Eastern's policy of requiring maternity leave after the thir-
teenth week of pregnancy was justified. But, Eastern's require-
ment of maternity leave upon knowledge of pregnancy and until
the thirteenth week was not a valid business necessity.
An underlying concern for the circuit court was the pos-
sibility of an air disaster. The court did not want to "require un-
reasonable experimentation with business."" In the court's
view, an integral aspect of the airline's function was to eliminate
the potentials for disaster. This function required the airline to
,,3 Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 374 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 371.
'12 "The ultimate chore of managing risks to passengers .. .falls to the
airline, and in deference to the complexity of the task a court should not facilely
substitute a judicial judgment that the resultant leave policy is unnecessary to
the safe and efficient transportation of the passengers." Id.
13 Id. at 371-72.
" Id. at 372.
' Id. at 373.
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consider more than just objective, computerized factors in
determining its business policies. Thus, Eastern's business
policy would be legitimate if it was reasonably based upon all
the information available to Eastern at the time it made its
policy. 8 Furthermore, there was no evidence that Eastern had
not based its mandatory maternity leave policy on medical evi-
dence known to it at the time.137 According to the court, the Lor-
illard business necessity test did not require each underlying as-
sumption in Eastern's business practice to be proven."u
One underlying assumption the circuit court felt Eastern
didn't need to prove was the inability of pregnant women to
safely perform their jobs. Rather, if Eastern thought pregnancy
could affect passenger safety, then this would be a legitimate
consideration in determining its business policies. This indicates
that if Eastern's policy seemed to be reasonably based, then it
could not be challenged even if it was in part based upon stereo-
typical assumptions concerning physical ability. Indeed, the
district court heard the conflicting medical testimony concern-
ing the ability of pregnant flight attendants and held that until
the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy it was not conclusive that
all pregnant women were physically impaired. Notwithstanding
this, the circuit court called the medical evidence largely subjec-
tive.39 To the circuit court, all that was necessary was for
Eastern to make a reasonable business judgment based upon in-
formation known to them at the time. This implies that a bus-
iness practice may be held a valid business necessity regardless
of medical evidence that may later develop and regardless of
contrary evidence concerning the performance abilities of those
employees affected.
Finally, the circuit court measured the extent of the impact
upon the flight attendants as a loss of fifteen weeks of employ-
ment. Thus, Eastern's concern for passenger safety was found
1$6 Id.
:3 Id. at 372.
' This part of the court's discussion related to whether Eastern's business
practice was a pretext for discrimination. While the issue of pretext is technically
part of the employer's defense in rebutting the inference of discriminatory
motive, see note 22 supra, here, the court was considering whether Eastern's
practice was legitimately designed for passenger safety. Id.
I Id. at 371.
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sufficiently compelling to override this adverse impact." ' The
circuit court did not cite, nor does there appear to be, any prece-
dent for this approach of measuring the extent of the impact in
applying the business necessity defense. It would seem if East-
ern's business purpose was sufficiently compelling it would over-
ride any adverse impact; the amount of time lost on the job
should actually be irrelevant. Instead, the court is suggesting
that if the flight attendants had lost more than fifteen weeks of
employment, Eastern's business purpose may not have been
compelling enough. Further, this approach may result in forcing
employees to show other adverse impacts besides the loss of
their jobs. Yet, it would seem the loss of a job is impact enough
upon employment opportunity, regardless of the amount of time
involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rule stated in Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. that in
Title VII sex discrimination cases a clear disparate treatment
discrimination will be tested by a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation and a clear disparate impact discrimination will be tested
by a business necessity defense has been shown to be supported
by general practices of the courts. Also, the rule appears to be
in line with the development of Title VII theories and defenses.
Furthermore, this rule makes a valid distinction between the
defenses. The BFOQ is a narrow statutory exception which
relates to ability, while the business necessity defense is a
balancing test which focuses upon a neutral business practice.
The difference in the result of these defenses can be observed in
the different outcomes of the district court and circuit court in
Burwell. The district court found the majority of Eastern's man-
datory maternity leave policy unjustifiable on the basis of a
BFOQ. The circuit court, however, included other considerations
such as the complexity of the business decision and the extent of
the discriminatory impact as factors in the balancing of the
business necessity defense.
The circuit court qualifies the Burwell rule by saying it
should apply when "clear" disparate treatment or "clear"
disparate impact is shown. But at the least, the Burwell rule im-
11 Id. at 371-72.
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plies an initial inquiry into the type of theory involved in prov-
ing the Title VII discrimination. Both the district court and the
circuit court failed to make this initial inquiry. Both courts
assumed Eastern's mandatory maternity leave policy was a neu-
tral policy with disparate impact. It is arguable, however, that
this policy is in fact disparate treatment discrimination. If so,
then according to the Burwell rule a BFOQ would be the proper
defense. Despite the circuit court's observation that disparate
treatment of disparate impact may be presented as alternative
grounds for relief,"' as the circumstances in Burwell demon-
strate, the type of theory used will make a difference in the
available defense. The defense used may then make a difference
in the outcome.
Finally, the circuit court differed in its application of the
business necessity defense. While the district court emphasized
the availability of alternative practices, the circuit court added
two more factors to the Lorillard balancing test. First, the court
found the area of risk management to be complex and did not
want to substitute a judicial judgment for a business judgement.
Second, the court measured the extent of the impact upon the
flight attendants. Since they only lost fifteen weeks of employ-
ment, the business purpose of providing for passenger safety
was held compelling enough to override this impact discrimina-
tion. It remains to be seen whether these two factors will be fur-
ther expanded or limited in future sex discrimination cases.
14 2
Debra G. Archer
. Id. at 369 n.9.
" The plaintiffs in Burwell petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Their
questions presented included: (1) whether the plaintiffs must also prove that
Eastern failed to act reasonably at the time of adopting the discrimination policy
when they have already shown prima facie discriminatory impact and rebutted
Eastern's defense by demonstrating alternative policies, (2) whether a reasonable-
ness standard may be substituted for a business necessity standard, and (3)
whether the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is permitted by FED. R. Civ. P. 52 to
ignore findings of fact made by the district court without holding that the find-
ings were clearly erroneous. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3549-50 (1981).
Eastern also petitioned for review. It questioned the holding that its man-
datory maternity leave policy for the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy was in
violation of section 703(a) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-200e-17 (1976). See 49
U.S.L.W. 3581-82 (1981).
Both Burwell and Eastern were denied review. 49 U.S.L.W. 3636 (1981).
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